Priority of Future Advances Lending
Under the Uniform Commercial Code

I. INTRODUCTION

Although the Uniform Commercial Code seems to exhaustively detail
the priorities to be given the security interests created by its revolutionary Article 9, recent commentary' has revealed that the Code's
priority treatment is somewhat less than complete. When either lien
creditor or holder of a security interest perfected other than by filing
intervenes between disbursements made by a lender who is financing
by means of a secured future advances loan, the Code does not clearly
assign the priority of advances made subsequent to that intervention.
This comment explores three areas. First, it briefly examines the
historic and potential uses of future advances lending. By demonstrating
the commercial utility of future advances lending the importance of a
clear statement of priority for this type of financing is made more apparent. Second, it discusses at somewhat greater length the Code's
obscure and ambiguous "treatment," or more frankly, lack of treatment, of future advances priorities. It develops that the Code does
not really give any shape to the concept of the "security interest,"
despite the fact that security interests represent the major concern of
Article 9. Thus, similar to difficulties concerning proceeds and shifting
1 See P. COOGAN, W. HOGAN, & D. VAGTS, SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORMa
CommERciAL CODE § 7.03 at 689, § 15.09 at 1606 (1963); G. GILMORE, 2 SEcuRrTY INTERESTS IN
PERSONAL PROPERTY § 35 (1965) [hereinafter cited as GILMORE]; Coogan, Intangibles as
Collateral Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 77 HARv. L. REv. 997 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Coogan, 77 HARv. L. REv. 997]; Coogan, Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code: PrioritiesAmong Secured Creditors and the "Floating Lien:" 72 HALv.
L. Ray. 838 (1959) (earlier version of COOAN, HOGAN, & VAcTs, supra § 7.03) [hereinafter
cited as Coogan, 72 HA.v. L. REv. 838]; Coogan & Gordon, The Effect of the Uniform
Commercial Code Upon Receivables Financing-Some Answers and Some Unresolved
Problems, 76 HAv. L. REv. 1529 (1963) (original of COOGAN, HOGAN & VAGTS, supra,

§ 15.09) [hereinafter cited as Coogan & Gordon, 76 HAv. L. Ray. 1529]; Goodwin, Priorities in Secured Transactions-Article9, Uniform Commercial Code, 20 Bus. LAw. 877
(1965); Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law of the American Bar Association, A PracticalApproach to the Uniform Commercial Code for the Practicing Lawyer,
19 Bus. LAw. 5 (1963); Marsh, Book Review, 13 U.C.L.A.L. REy. 898 (1966); Young, Book
Review, 66 COLUM. L. REv. 1571 (1966).
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stock,2 the extent of the secured party's priority will depend upon
resolution of the conceptual problem of the security interest's continuity or "spread." Finally, this comment suggests an approach to
solution of future advances priorities.
II.

USES OF SECuRED FUTURE ADVANCES LENDING

Just about anyone can lend using a secured future advances lending
arrangement. If the cases are any indication, however, these lenders
tend to be merchants, bankers, and new-style factors. But a secured
future advances borrower is someone special, because he can only meet
his capital requirements if he is able to fund his enterprise bit by bit
and offer security. Current writing on the subject of secured future
advances loans gives the impression that they are used chiefly if not
solely to finance building construction. 3 However, as earlier writers
have noted, 4 the secured future advances loan was used in a variety of
contexts. 5 This broad range of applicability makes sense if one considers
this lending device from a functional point of view.
There appear to be several prerequisites which must be met before
a secured future advances arrangement will be utilized. First, of course,
the borrower must be in a sufficiently risky financial position so that the
lender demands security; he must be unable to get his loan except on
a secured basis.6 Second, the law must make valuable property available
2 See, e.g., Ray Henson's literate account of the "proceeds" problem in Henson, "Proceeds" under the Uniform Commercial Code, 65 COLUm. L. R-v. 232 (1965).
3 "The institutional transaction out of which future advance law grew was the building construction loan. In time the device was adapted to working capital loans with the
mortgage covering both the real and personal property of the mortgagor enterprise."
GnLMoRE § 35.3, at 925. See also Note, Mortgages Securing Future Advances-A Need for
Legislation, 47 IowA L. REv. 432 (1962); Note, Refinements in Additional Advance Financing: The "Open End" Mortgage, 38 MNN. L. REv. 507 (1954).
4 See, e.g., G. OSBORNE, MORTGAGES § 113 (1951) [hereinafter cited as OSBORNE]: "There
are many transactions in which business desirability is heavily on the side of a mortgage
securing [future advances]... . Typical of such dealings are construction or improvement
loans with installments to be advanced as the work progresses; mortgages by way of
indemnity for prospective indorsements, guarantees, and accommodations of commercial
paper to be issued by the mortgagor; fluctuating current balances under lines of credit
established with the mortgagee; and as security for a bond issue, or a series of issues." See
also I G. GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES AND PREFERENCES § 372 (rev. ed. (1940); Jones,
Mortgages Securing FutureAdvances, 8 TX. L. REv. 371, 371-72 (1930).
5 Under discussion here are what might be termed "legitimate" future advances lending
arrangements. Some lenders may claim that an indebtedness which has no relation to a
given future advances lending arrangement falls under the protection of a broad future
advances clause. Assertions of priority for such unrelated obligations, appropriately and
colorfully termed "Anaconda mortgages," have been rejected by the courts. See GiLMORE
§ 35.2.
6 See A. Sw.arsER, FiNANCING GoODs 123 (1963).
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as collateral. 7 In the last half-century at least, the history of the financing of business is in part the history of an attempt by lenders, courts,
and legislatures to open up new sources of collateral.8 Third, the lender
must be unwilling to make his loan except bit by bit9 and the borrower must be able to make use of the loan in this form. For example,
the manufacturer of textiles whose production involves a number of
time-consuming interrelated steps may be able to take advantage of a
future advances loan.10 Fourth, the collateral must be, or must be
capable of becoming, valuable enough to cover the entire sum of advances.
Given these prerequisites, the employment of future advances lending in a construction loan is understandable. The home builder, for
example, can put up his undeveloped plot of land as collateral through
a mortgage. His real estate can increase in value as the borrowed money
is applied to its improvement. Legally, the improvements would be
welded to the real estate by the doctrine of "fixtures" of "accessions,"''
thus swelling the collateral and the size of the available secured loan.
The lender can minimize the risk of his investment by disbursing the
loan bit by bit. Furthermore, the home builder does not need a lump
sum at the outset; he needs a continuing supply of capital to pay for
work and materials as building progresses. The home builder, then, is
able to secure a loan which in the aggregate might exceed the initial
value of the security he is able to offer. Under such conditions the frequent employment12 of the future advances loan for building construction is not surprising.
It should be realized, however, that future advances lending was in
wide use as early as the nineteenth century to fund entrepreneurial
activity in areas other than building construction."3 In the early English
7

The Code increases the range of such property available for use as collateral. UmroRX
UCC]. See generally

COMMRCiAL CoDz § 9-105(l)(c) (1958 version) [hereinafter cited as
Coogan & Gordon, 76 HAzv. L. REv. 1529.

8 For an eminently readable account of this history see GamoRE §§l -8.
9 See Eripke, Current Assets Financingas a Source of Long-Term Capital, 36 MINN. L.
REv. 506, 513 (1952).
10 See A. SwrMzrsE,

FINANCING GooDS 121 (1963).
l1 See, e.g., Coogan, Security Interests in Fixtures Under the Uniform Commercial Code,
75 HA{v. L. REv. 1319 (1962); Kripke, Fixtures Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 64
CoLuM. L. Rv. 44 (1964).
12 Note, Mortgages Securing Future Advances: A Need for Legislation, 47 IowA L. REv.
432 (1962).
18 Every early "leading" case in the future advances field shows the use of the future
advances mortgage of real estate either to provide or to underwrite working capital for
business enterprise. See Shirras v. Craig, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 34 (1812) (financing of merchants); Ackerman v. Hunsicker, 85 N.Y. 43 (1881) (indorsing business firm's notes);
Robinson v. Williams, 22 N.Y. 380, 383 (1860) (mortgage of bank premises to cover
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case, Hopkinson v. Rolt,14 often cited as a leading authority in the
future advances field, a merchant used a future advances loan to provide working capital for his shipbuilding business, putting up his con-

siderable real estate holdings as security. The history of the use of this
type of lending seems to indicate that real estate was unsatisfactory as
collateral, since the entrepreneur would need valuable real estate holdings initially or would have to pour the borrowed money into the
improvement of his existing, less valuable real estate. The appearance
of more attractive collateral may, indeed, have been the reason for the
curious disappearance, toward the close of the nineteenth century, of
reports of loans like that in Rolt.15 As new sources of collateral opened
up,16 first by common law factor's lien and trust receipt, then by sofluctuating balance); Hopkinson v. Rolt, 9 H.L. Cas. 514, 11 Eng. Rep. 829 (1861) (working
capital for shipbuilder).
For like use of the future advances device, see Bell v. Raddliff, 32 Ark. 645 (1878) (deed
of trust of cotton crop to secure advances of supplies needed by partnership to cultivate a
plantation); Tapia v. Demartini, 77 Cal. 383, 19 P. 641 (1888) (mortgage to cover equipment sold to mining partnership); Langerman v. Puritan Dining Room Company, 21 Cal.
App. 637, 132 P. 617 (1913) (mortgage to secure line of credit to dining room company);
Boswell v. Goodwin, 31 Conn. 74 (1862) (mortgage to cover indorsement of paper manufacturer's notes and advances); Weiser Loan & Trust Co. v. Comerford, 41 Ida. 172, 238
P. 515 (1925) (mortgage to secure fluctuating balance); Speer v. Skinner, 35 Ill. 282 (1864)
(hotel furniture mortgaged by hotel operators to secure advances of working capital);
Collins v. Carlile, 13 IMI. 254 (1851) (mortgage by merchant to cover purchases of goods
from a St. Louis distributor); Louisville Banking Co. v. Leonard, 90 Ky. 106, 13. S.W. 521
(1890) (mortgage to secure discount of customer notes of furniture manufacturer); Downing v. Palmateer, 17 Ky. (I T.B. Mon.) 64 (1824) (mortgage of female slave to cover advances of liquor and other necessaries to tavern keepers in Lexington); Hall v. Jay, 131
Mass. 192 (1881) (mortgage to secure purchases of coal by a retail coal-dealer from a wholesaler); Commercial Bank v. Cunningham, 41 Mass. (24 Pick.) 270 (1837) (mortgage to secure
future indemnities); McDaniels v. Colvin, 16 Vt. 300 (1884) (mortgage to cover what may
be owed "on book'); Brinkerhoff v. Marvin, 5 Johns. Ch. R. 320 (N.Y. 1821); Hendricks v.
Robinson, 2 Johns. Ch. 283 (N.Y. 1817). Early cases showing use of future advances for
building construction do exist, but their appearance in the reports is infrequent until
near the turn of the century. See Crane v. Deming, 7 Conn. 386 (1829) (mortgage to secure
advances for construction of a bridge over the Passaic River); Barry v. Merchants' Exchange
Co., I Sandf. Ch. 280 (N.Y. 1844) (mortgage to construct "a granite fire-proof building [in
New York], which should be commensurate to the wants, as well as honorable to the
munificence of the commercial metropolis of the western world!).
14 9 H. L. Cas. 514, 11 Eng. Rep. 829 (1861).
15 There are, of course, many reasons why a given type of case may disappear from
reported cases, and perhaps even more reasons why the transaction itself may cease to be
used. As regards the particular type of lending arrangement under discussion, it may be,
for example, that the proportion of borrowers of working capital who owned real estate
decreased toward the end of the nineteenth century. Since the collateral was not available,
the loans were not made.
16 For development of twentieth-century availability of accounts receivable, inventory,
and contract rights as collateral, see G~muoRE §§ 5-8, 41.1; Dunham, Inventory and Accounts Receivable Financing,62 Hitv. L. Rxv. 588 (1949); Kripke, The "Secured Transactions" Provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, 35 VA. L. REv. 577 (1949); Skilton,

The University of Chicago Law Review

[Vol. 35:128

called factor's lien acts, accounts receivable and trust receipt legislation, 17 future advances lending remained,' 8 but new kinds of security
for financing the same transaction seemed to supplant the old.'9 Consequently, mortgages of real estate to secure future advances still exist
only where they are functionally appropriate, as in the building construction field.
The trend of future advances lending practices indicates its continuing use to finance risky entrepreneurial activity with increasingly
exotic forms of security: real estate and chattels to contract rights to
the Code's wispy "general intangibles." With a device of such apparent
usefulness, the priority which the Code accords it in default situations
holds special interest.
III. THE CODE'S PRESENTLY AMBIGUOUS TREATMENT OF FUTURE
ADvAN C s PRoRITEs

A. The Problem
Unfortunately, the Code has not clearly specified the priority which
a future advances lender will receive over other creditors of the borrower should resort to security be necessary.20 This ambiguity may affect the availability of the secured future advances loan.
The Factor'sLien on Merchandise, 1955 Wis. L. Rxv. 356; Steffen &Danziger, The Rebirth
of the Commercial Factor, 56 CoLUm. L. Rzv. 744 (1956); Comment, Financing Inventory
Through Field Warehousing, 69 YArz L.J. 665, 670 (1960); Comment, Contract Rights as
Commercial Security-Presentand Future Intangibles, 67 Ym. L.J. 847 (1958).
17 See GtLsoRE §§ 1-8; Kripke, The "Secured Transactions" Provisions of the Uniform
Commercial Code, 55 VA. L. RLV. 577 (1949); Skilton, The Factor'sLien on Merchandise,
1955 Wis. L. Rav. 356, 609; Steffen SeDanziger, The Rebirth of the Commercial Factor,
56 COLUx. L. Ry. 744 (1956).
18 The following illustrate the use of the future advances loan in a variety of contexts:
The Seattle, 170 F. 284 (9th Cir. 1909); In re Cichanowicz, 226 F. Supp. 288 (E.D.N.Y. 1964);
Reidy v. Collins, 154 Cal. App. 715, 26 P.2d 712 (1955); Hance Hardware Co. v. Denbigh
Hall, Inc., 17 Del. Ch. 254, 152 A. 150 (Ch. Ct. 1950); New York &Suburban Fed. Say. & Loan
Ass'n v. Fi-Pen Realty Co., 155 N.Y.S.2d 3 (Sup. Ct. 1954); In re Harris' Estate, 156 Misc.
805, 282 N.Y.S. 571 (Surr. Ct. 1955); Housing Mortgage Corp. v. Allied Constr. Inc., 574
Pa. 512, 97 A.2d 802 (1955).
19 Coogan & Gordon, 76 HARv. L Rav. 1529, 1550 n.2. For examples of the use of new
collateral for similar transactions, see Rockmore v. Lehman, 128 F.2d 564 (2d Cir. 1942),
rev'd on rehearing, 129 F.2d 892 (2d Cir. 1942) (contract rights used to secure future advances); In re New York, N.H. & H.R.R. Co., 25 F. Supp. 874 (D.C. Conn. 1958) (assignment of contract rights to secure future advances).
20 The Code is not the only statutory enactment guilty of ambiguity on the question of
future advances priority. A similar brouhaha developed over the question of priority
under the new Federal Tax Lien Act. See W. PLUMB & L. WsIGHT, FD

M.',.TAX LiENs 77

(2d ed. 1967); Young, Priority of the Federal Tax Lien, 54 U. Cm. L. Rv. 723 (1967). A
similar confusion may exist on the question of priority for future advancing real estate
mortgages over fixtures subject to a security interest held by a Code secured party. See, e.g.,
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A hypothetical situation 2 in which the priority question arises will
illustrate the Code's presently ambiguous treatment of priority for the
future advancing secured lender. A merchant financer agrees to loan a
farmer 1,000 dollars to be paid out at the lender's discretion during
the course of the growing season. As security the merchant takes a
"security interest" in the fanner's agricultural equipment. The merchant files his "financing statement" in the proper administrative offices.
After crops have been harvested, but before the 1,000 dollars has been
completely disbursed, one of the farmer's general creditors obtains
judgment against him. Subsequently, the merchant makes a further
discretionary advance of the remainder of the 1,000 dollars with actual
notice of the intervening attachment. The farmer defaults in his payments to the lender, perhaps because the crops have not brought the
price expected, and the merchant finally brings action to foreclose his
security interest in the farmer's equipment. Since the farmer's equipment is not valuable enough to satisfy both the merchant and the
creditor, a dispute over priority arises. In this situation (or in another
involving an intervening secured creditor who perfects his security
interest other than by filing), i.e. when a party breaks the stream of the
secured party's advances, whether those advances were made at the
secured party's pleasure or pursuant to a binding commitment, the
question of the priority to be awarded advances made after the break
arises.
B. Code Treatment

If, to answer the question, resort is made to explicit treatment of
the priorities in the Code, the search will be i vain. Unlike its treatment of some security interest priorities, the Code has no provision
which specifically details the priority to be given a future advances
security interest over other, intervening interests. 22 It does have a proComment, Fixtures in the Landlord-Tenant Relationship,34 U. Cm. L. Rrv. 617, 630 n.71

(1967).
21 This situation is an embroidered version of the facts in Lovelace v. Webb, 62 Ala.
271 (1878). Cf. McNeil v. Conyers, 80 S.C. 571, 61 S.E. 1068 (1901).
22 Since there is no explicit provision which governs the priority of the future advancing lender over the intervening lien creditor or secured party who perfects other than
by filing, a rule may be provided by resort to pre-Code priority rules. California apparently
noticed the Codes "applicability gap" and closed it by grafting its statutory pre-Code
priority rule onto its version of Code section 9-312. This new subsection (7) of 9-312, CAL.
STATS. ch. 819 (1963), provided: "The secured party takes priority as to the future advances
specified below from the time his security interest was originally perfected: (a) If a maximum amount to be secured is stated in the filed financing statement (or in a security
agreement where a financing statement is not required to be filed), as to all advances up
to that amount outstanding at any one time (without regard to advances already repaid
or discharged), whether the making of such advances is optional with or obligatory upon
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vision of general applicability, section 9-312(5),2 which assigns future
advances priority in some situations. Thus, if a contest is between two
secured lenders who have "perfected" their security interest by filing,
the first to file wins. But if the intervening party has a security interest
"perfected" other than by filing, or is an unsecured but "lien creditor,"
those Code provisions which are of general applicability, sections
9-312(5)24 and 9-201,25 do not unambiguously assign priority. They fail
to assign priority because the extent or spread of the "security interest"
created by the disbursements of a future advances loan has not been
articulated by the Code. Once this conceptual problem is answered,
priority may be deduced from the Code's general, catch-all sections.
The Heraclitian metaphysics required to formulate a concept of the
security interest created by the multiple disbursements of a future
advances arrangement is similar to that involved in the visualization
of the so-called "floating lien." The "floating lien" is like a cloud driftthe secured party; (b) If a maximum amount to be secured is not so stated, as to all obligatory advances, and as to all optional advances made by the secured party without knowledge of an intervening right; and (c) In all cases as to advances and expenditures made by
the secured party for the protection, maintenance, preservation or repair of the collateral ..."'The subsection was roundly criticized in Coogan, 77 HAv. L. REv. 997, 1021,
largely on the ground of its unduly broad scope. Its repeal, CAL. STATS. ch. 1379, § 17 (1965),
was apparently the result of this criticism. See CAuoIrFORN
CONTINUING
BAR, Rnxw or SarxcrED 1965 CODE LEGISLATiON 103 (1966).

EDUCATION

OF THE

However , no specific legislative enactment of a pre-Code priority rule-a rule whose
formulation is discussed in the text following note 65-may be needed to supply a rule
where the Code leaves a gap. Section 10-102(3) of the Code provides for particular and
general repeal of previous legislation regulating personal property secured transactions.
Since the Code sweeps away only previous legislative regulation of future advances priorities and arguably provides no substitute in its stead, it may be asserted that the preCode common law rule of future advances priority has continued or has renewed validity.
Arguably, then, the repeal of section 9-312(7) by the California legislature had the effect
of reinstating its common law priority rule. See, e.g., Reidy v. Collins, 134 Cal. App. 713,
26 P.2d 712 (1933).
23 UCC § 9-312(5): "In all cases not governed by other rules stated in this section (including cases of purchase money security interests which do not qualify for the special
priorities set forth in subsections (3) and (4) of this section), priority between conflicting
security interests in the same collateral shall be determined as follows:
(a) in the order of filing if both are perfected by filing ...."
24 UCC § 9-312(5)(b): "In all cases not governed by other rules stated in this section
(including cases of purchase money security interests which do not qualify for the special
priorities set forth in subsections (3)and (4) of this section), priority between conflicting
security interests in the same collateral shall be determined as follows:
(b) in the order of perfection unless both are perfected by filing, regardless of which
security interest attached first under Section 9-204(1) and, in the case of a filed security
interest, whether it attached before or after filing...."
25 UCC § 9-201: "General Validity of Security Agreement. Except as otherwise provided by this Act a security agreement is effective according to its terms between the
parties, against purchasers of the collateral and against creditors.. ..
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ing over a river; 26 the shadow cast remains the same, but the substance
passing under the shadow is in a state of constant flux, of continuous
depletion and replenishment. The lien created in inventory financing,
then, can be said to float over the shifting inventory of the borrower
just as a cloud floats over an ever-changing river. In the future advances
context, attention shifts from the water below to the cloud above. The
available definitions of the "security interest" concept may be framed
in terms of our cloud analogy. Disbursements either create a security
interest which is like one big cloud that mushrooms as further advances
are made; or they create security interests incapable of growth, so that
the advances generate a separate security interest--cloud-for each advance, each equal in extent to the value given or promised to be given
by the secured lender at that time. Once a decision is made as to the
extent of the security interest or interests created by the disbursements,
the priority to be given the future advances secured lender follows as
the result of a rather long deductive chain.
27
The beginning point of the chain is either section 9-312(5)(b), if
the intervening party is another secured creditor, and he or the future
advances lender has "perfected" other than by filing; or sections 9-20128
and 9-301(l)(b), 29 if the intervening party is a lien creditor without
notice" of the security interest. If the intervening party is another
26 Skilton, The Factor'sLien on Merchandise, 1955 Wis. L. REv. 609, 631.
27 See note 24 supra.

See note 25 supra.
UCC § 9-301: "(1) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (2), an unperfected
security interest is subordinate to the rights of
28
29

(b) a person who becomes a lien creditor without knowledge of the security interest and
before it is perfected; ...
(3) A "lien creditor" means a creditor who has acquired a lien on the property involved
by attachment, levy or the like and includes an assignee for benefit of creditors from the
time of assignment, and a trustee in bankruptcy from the date of the filing of the petition
or a receiver in equity from the time of appointment...."
30 The Code does not specify whether actual or constructive knowledge of the security
interest will destroy the lien creditor's priority over an unperfected security interest. See
note 29 supra. Were an actual knowledge construction adopted, then, in the future
advances context, the secured lender, to assure himself of priority over intervening lien
creditors would need, as a practical matter, to notify all the borrower's general creditors
of his financing arrangement before he gave "value" to the borrower. After this initial
mass notification and after the first giving of "value," the secured lender in a discretionary
advances arrangement would, under the interpretation of the Code in which discretionary
advances create a series of perfected security interests (see text accompanying note 26
supra), need to take the further step of notifying each of the borrower's general creditors.
Were a constructive knowledge interpretation of section 9-301(l)(b) adopted, then, presumably the secured lender would need only to file to give the intervening lien creditors
constructive notice. He would then be assured of priority if his advances fell under a
security interest which was perfected before the intervening party became a lien creditor of
of the borrower.
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secured party, then section 9-312(5)(b) directs that he who is first to
"perfect" his security interest receives priority. If the intervening party
is a lien creditor, then sections 9-201 and 9-301(1)(b) when read together yield the negative implication that the secured party, in order
to take priority over the lien creditor must have "perfected" his security
interest. "Perfection" of the future advancing party's security interest
is thus crucial to the secured lender's priority over either of the intervening parties.
Perfection of a security interest is accomplished by a number of steps
outlined in related sections of the Code. Under section 9-303: "A security interest is perfected when it has attached and when all of the applicable steps required for perfection have been taken. Such steps are
specified in sections 9-302, 9-304, 9-305, and 9-306 . . ." A security
interest has "attached" when, among other things, "value" has been
given by the secured party.8 ' Section 1-201(44) defines the giving of
value:
(.. person gives "value" for rights if he acquires them
[A]
(a) in return for a binding commitment to extend credit...
(d) generally, in return for any consideration sufficient to
support a simple contract.
Thus, assuming all other steps of section 9-303B,2 have been taken, a
future advances security interest is "perfected" either when the lender
makes his first advance or, if advances are made pursuant to a binding
commitment, at the time when the security agreement is accepted.
Having perfected a security interest, the future advancing lender,
under the provisions of section 9-312(5)(b) or sections 9-201 and
9-301(1)(b), can be assured of priority over the secured party or lien
creditor to the extent of his previously existing security interest. At this
point the cloud analogy becomes relevant, for where discretionary advances are made the extent of the security interest created by those
advances must be determined. If many discrete security interests are
created83 a gap develops which allows a lien creditor to slip in before
a subsequent, perfected security interest is created by a subsequent

M1
UCC § 9-204: "A security interest cannot attach until there is agreement (subsection
(3) of Section 1-201) that it attach and value is given and the debtor has rights in the
collateral. It attaches as soon as all of the events in the preceding sentence have taken
place unless explicit agreement postpones the time of attaching."
32 UCC § 9-303: "A security interest is perfected when it has attached and when all of
the applicable steps required for perfection have been taken. Such steps are specified in
Sections 9-302, 9-304, 9-305 and 9-306 ......
83 This conception is adopted by Coogan. See Coogan, 77 HAxv. L. PEv. 997.
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advance.3 4 If a single, mushrooming security interest is created, 35 then
all advances are embraced and continuously perfected from the time
value is first given.3 6 Under the first or discrete interest view of the
future advances security interests, the secured party is given priority
over the intervening lien creditor only for subsequent advances made
pursuant to a binding commitment; his discretionary advances are
subordinated. Under the second or single interest view, the secured
party is always given priority once his security interest has "attached"
either by executing a binding commitment to make advances or by
making the first advance.

IV.

THE CuRRENT DEBATE AMONG THE COMMENTATORS OVER

THE "PROPER" INTERPRETATION OF THE "SECURITY

INTEREST"

Thus, either of two rules of priority may be deduced from the Code.
Supporters with impressive credentials may be found for either view.
Their arguments, generally emphasizing the question of what is the
"proper" conception of the Code "security interest," seem inconclusive at most. The thrust of these arguments, generally, is that the
proffered conception is most consistent with companion provisions of
the Code. These arguments, along with their corresponding counterarguments, could be set out as follows:
1. Since the future advances agreement seems analogous to the
after-acquired property clause, which, under subsections (1) and (2) of
section 9-204, creates a series of security interests as the debtor obtains
rights in the collateral, the future advances relationship, like the afteracquired property clause, should create a series of security interests as
well. To avoid conceptual inconsistency, then, a discrete interests view
should be adopted. 37
In reply to this argument a distinction between the concept of old
rights in new collateral and the concept of new rights in old collateral
may be drawn. There is, therefore, no conceptual inconsistency when
34 Under this view, only when advances are given pursuant to a binding commitment
will they relate back to the time of perfection under the initial agreement. Priority given to
these obligatory advances may be conceptually rationalized by saying that they represent
a part of the value of the security interest whose extent was fixed by the security agreement.
35 This conception is adopted by Professor Gilmore. See GmmoRE §§ 35.6, 35.7.
36 Thus, assuming the lender has met all requirements of § 9-303 except "attachment,"
the lien creditor or other secured party, in order to take priority over the future advancing
lender, must achieve lien creditor status or perfect his security interest either before a
binding commitment is executed or, if advances are given at the lender's discretion, before
the first advance is made.
37 See Coogan, 77 HAxv. L. REv. 997, 1028; Coogan, 72 HAxv. L. R v. 838, 868.
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differing priority rules which embody these different concepts are used
in differing situations. Even though under section 9-204(1) a series of
security interests arises as the debtor acquires rights in the collateral,
it does not follow that the secured party's interest in after-acquired
property will be subordinated to the interest of intervening secured or
lien creditors, since the debtor acquires rights in his collateral subject
to the rights of the secured party. Just because collateral is acquired in
lumps, then, does not mean that rights in that collateral must be also.8s
2. Under section 9-204(1) a security interest cannot attach until
"value is given"; section 1-201(37) states that a security interest "secures
payment or performance of an obligation." Thus, each time the debtor
becomes obligated to repay the lender-and new obligations are being
created with every advance-a new security interest is created to secure
performance of his obligation. Therefore, a series of discrete security
interests is created. 9
In reply it may be said that sections 9-204(1) and 1-201(37) speak only
to the creation of security interests, not their extent. There is nothing
inconsistent between these sections and the opposing single interest
view of the security interest. One may grant that an obligation is
created when value is given, and merely add that the security interest,
once created to secure payment or performance of an obligation, may
continue to grow as more obligations fall under its protection. A series
of obligations does not preclude a single, mushrooming security interest
which grows to embrace those obligations.
3. UCC section 9-311 reads:
The debtor's rights in collateral may be voluntarily or involuntarily transferred... notwithstanding a provision in the
security agreement prohibiting any transfer or making the
transfer constitute a default.
The single interest view, which gives priority even as to discretionary
advances, would appear to frustrate the spirit of section 9-311 if a
lender were allowed by a single agreement to make discretionary advances and in effect mortgage all the debtor's property away. Such

agreements would appear to seriously impair the ability of the debtor
voluntarily or involuntarily to transfer his rights in the collateral, since
few would be found, except perhaps a buyer in the ordinary course of
business, who would buy an equity in collateral which could be swal-

40
lowed up by subsequent discretionary advances by the secured lender.
8 See GuMoRE § 55.6, at 956-37. Cf. OsBoRNa,5 114, at 277-78 (1951).
S9 See Coogan, 77 HARv. L. Rlrv. 997, 1028; Coogan, 72 HARv. L. REv. 838, 868.
40 See Coogan, 77 HAxv. L. REv. 997, 1029, 1054; Coogan & Gordon, 76 HARv. L. Rzv.
1529, 1550; Coogan, 72 Hagv. L. REv. 858, 868.
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It is true, as the argument suggests, that the debtor is to be left the
ability to transfer his rights in collateral. But he may transfer them, as
the section itself declares, by creation of a security interest. The Code
gives full validity to both after-acquired property clauses and future
advances arrangements. Under section 9-312(5)(a): ". . . priority between conflicting security interests in the same collateral shall be determined as follows: (a) in the order of filing if both are perfected by
filing .... ." If a debtor chooses, therefore, to transfer all his rights in
collateral to a single secured party the Code seems to offer no objection
and will protect the secured party against a later filing by a secured
41
party.
4. For purposes of priority there seems to be no predisposition in
the Code against the division of obligations into parts, as required by
the discrete interests view. Where, for example, part of a debt is a
purchase money obligation, the purchase money interest is entitled to
priority over conflicting security interests under section 9-312(3) and (4).
Thus, there would be no conceptual inconsistency in saying that for
purposes of priority each discretionary advance by the future advancing
lender creates a separate security interest.4
It may be answered that because the Code divides obligations in
some areas does not mean that it must do so in others. For example, the
reasons for giving a purchase money interest priority over other obligations may be quite different from reasons for allowing or not allowing
priority to the future advancing lender for his discretionary advances.
V. PoLicY PERSPECrIVES OF THE ALTERNATIVE RULEs
It is possible to argue, then, about the "proper" conception of the
security interest, but these mildly persuasive arguments seem about in
balance. Perhaps the real issue dividing the commentators, and what
seems a more relevant concern in any event, involves assessments of the
most desirable policy or policies which a priority rule should further.
Choice of policy is a political question; evaluation of the efficacy of a
priority rule in furthering a policy is an empirical question. Although
this comment cannot purport to conclusively answer either question,
analysis is measurably advanced by at least asking them. In deciding
who should win a priority contest, a range of policies could be considered.
First, on the broadest level of inquiry one can ask whether it is
41 See GmmoREJ 35.6 n.3.

42 See Coogan, 77 HAv. L. Rzv. 997, 1028, 1030.
43 Cf. Coogan, 72 HAtv. L. REv. 838, 861; Gilmore, The Purchase Money Priority,
76 HARV. L.REv. 1333 (1963).
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desirable to promote secured credit. It could be argued, as it has been
argued, 44 that the future advances lending device is basically a beneficial mechanism which promotes the infusion of capital into business
enterprises which otherwise could not exist. Given this premise, that
priority rule which least hinders the lending device could be chosen.
Second, one could argue that secured credit is basically to be avoided
since secured lenders already possess too much power over the economically disadvantaged borrowers who must take a future advances
loan and give security. It would seem to follow that the discrete interest
view of the security interest, which loosens the secured creditor's grip
on the debtor's assets, would be preferable.
Of course, one's inquiry need not be so far-reaching or politically
conscious. Other, narrower questions could be considered. A third
approach would be to award priority between the two immediate
parties on the basis of the fairest solution. Obviously, any number of
factors of greater or lesser particularity might be relevant in deciding
what award of priority is most "fair." But certain factors, such as the
secured lender's actual knowledge of intervening interests may claim a
special place in equitable considerations. On the other hand, it may
be argued that harsh consequences must be tolerated if other considerations are sufficiently compelling. The Code is not devoid of its
harsh rules. As a chief proponent of the discrete interests view has
noted:
Although the application of a priority rule in a particular
situation usually has a basis in common sense, the priority
rules of the Code are in many ways as arbitrary as the rule in
a bridge game that says that an ace takes priority over a
king ....
... [S]ometimes the secured party who does nothing to put
others on guard gets a higher priority than he would have
attained had he taken all steps possible to put others on notice
of his secured claim.45
In the next three sections these three policies are considered in
greater detail. As the discussion suggests, the impact 46of either priority
rule on any one of these policies is difficult to assess.
44 See Ackerman v. Hunsicker, 85 N.Y. 43 (1881).
45 Coogan & Gordon, 76 HARv. L. REv. 1529, 1563-64.
46 At least eight successive drafts of the Code contained some provision which expressly
provided for future advances priority over some third party. Since the last of these provisions was deleted in ALl & NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE

LAws, 1952 OFFICIAL DRAFT

OF TEXT AND COMMENTS OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
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74 (Supp. I, 1955) (for discussion of this deletion, see Coogan, 77 HARv. L. REv. 997, 1020
n.69), there has been no revival of explicit future advances priorities treatment.
However, a brief statutory history provides material for either side of the current debate.
Compare I ALl & NATIONAL CONFERENCE

OF COMMISSIONERS

ON UNIFORM

STATE LAWS,

Revision of Article 7 for Use in July 25-27, 1949 Meeting 47, 49 (1949) (unpublished early
draft of the secured transactions section in University of Chicago Law School Library) text:
Section 7-406. Priorities Among Security Interests.
(2) In the case of goods other than inventory
(b) an interest attaching by reason of new value given after an earlier lender
has perfected an interest in the same collateral takes precedence over the first
perfected interest to the extent the first perfected secured value given after notice
was given by the later lender to the first lender if such notice was given not more
than ten days before the new value was given and indicates the amount of value
given and the collateral claimed....
and corresponding Comments:
A lender may advance $50,000 and take back a security interest in plant
equipment worth $100,000. It should then be possible for the borrower to borrow
on his remaining equity and if a different lender makes the second advance, his
interest should, although subordinate to the interest securing the earlier $50,000
advance [be] protected against an interest later claimed by the first lender arising
out of subsequent advances. The first lender, on the other hand, is entitled to
notice that a subsequent lender now claims an interest in the hitherto available
equity. Subsection (2)(b) adopts the approach above outlined, the second lender's
protection against subsequent advances by the earlier lender being conditioned on
his giving ten days notice before new value given.
with 2 ALI & NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAws, UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CoDE-PRoposED FINAL DRAFT 777-79 (1950) text:

Section 9-312. Conflicting Security Interests.
Except as otherwise provided ... when conflicting security interests attach to
the same collateral, such interests rank in the order of time of perfection with the
following exceptions:
(I) An interest attaching after a financing statement has been filed takes priority
from the time of its filing. Unless otherwise agreed to by the earlier lender such
priority holds also as to later advances made by him under the statement.
and Comments:
Lender A makes one loan on equipment; lender B then makes an advance on
the same collateral. Lender A makes an additional advance claiming his "future"
advance is entitled to the same priority as his first.
[This] is a problem which frequently arises in chattel mortgage situations
where a mortgagee is financing an entire operation but loans one sum today and
more as needed. In between the two loans, however, the debtor borrows from
another lender who was willing to be junior to the first sum loaned but who under
existing law thinks he is senior to later advances. In so far [sic] as existing law
gives the first lender priority for his later advances only if he was obligated to
make these advances this section changes the law. Under subsection (1) the first
lender has priority for all advances whether he is obligated to make them or
not....
and 3 ALI & NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, UNIFORM

772-75 (1952) text:
Section 9-312. Conflicting Security Interests: General Rules of Priority.
When conflicting security interests attach to the same collateral, such interests
rank in the order of time of perfection with the following exception:

COMMERCIAL CODE-OFFIcAL DRAFT

(2) A secured party who has a perfected security interest and who makes later
advances to the debtor on the same collateral and under the same security agreement takes priority as to the later advances from the time when his security
interest was originally perfected.
and Comments:
Section 9-204 validates security agreements which provide for the secured party
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VI. EFFECr OF THE PRionrrY RULES ON SECURED FuTuRE
ADVANCES LENDING

A. Facilitation of Secured Lending and Availability of Capital to
Borrowers as Affected by Administrative Expense
To the extent that it increases the expense of administering a discretionary future advances loan because the secured lender must make
increased checks of the public record, the first, or qualified priority, rule
would seem to thwart both a policy that secured lending should be
facilitated 47 and a policy that capital should be available to borrowers
under a discretionary future advances arrangement. 48 The second, or
full priority rule, on the other hand, would further both policies by dispensing with the practical necessity of checking for intervening interests
before disbursement of discretionary advances. If a burden is imposed
by the first rule, it may not be uniform, because the proportion of the
administrative expense to the aggregate value of a loan will vary with
the number of disbursements made by the lender. When a building
contractor is financed on security of his accounts and contract rights,
to make a series of advances against the same collateral. Under such a future
advance agreement the situation described in example (b) may arise. [A makes a
loan on equipment; B then makes an advance on the same collateral. Thereafter
A makes an additional advance claiming his "future" advance is entitled to the
same priority as his first.] Subsection (2) provides that advances made under the
future advance agreement take priority from the time the security interest was
originally perfected and consequently prevail over intervening advances made
by later secured parties.
This statutory history, it may be argued, shows a significant shift or shifts in the
draftsmen's intent. At first, as shown in the 1949 Revision of Article 7 (the former version
of Article 9), the draftsmen adopted an approach which gave the secured future advances
lender only limited priority over third parties; his string of protected advances could be
broken by an intervening secured lender. Later, however, this approach was abandoned
in favor of one which, as shown in the 1950 and 1952 drafts, gave the lender absolute
priority over the intervening secured party (provided he did not have a purchase money
security interest) and, a fortiori, over the intervening judgment creditor. Those who favor
greater protection of the future advances lender could argue that since no Code provision
expressly negatives the draftsmen's final approach, that approach should be adopted as
controlling ambiguous provisions. As a result the secured lender would receive absolute
priority over intervening Hen creditors and intervening secured lenders who perfect other
than by filing.
Those who favor less protection for the future advances lender could argue that there
have been two major shifts of the draftsmen's intent, not merely one. The first shift is that
described by the proponents above: from less to greater protection. The second, however, is
the reverse of the first; it is manifested by the 1958 amendment of the approach adopted
in the Official 1952 draft (absolute priority over the intervening secured party). The failure

to readopt the 1952 approach in any later version of the Code is only further evidence of
the draftsmen's commitment to a less expansive view of the future advances lender's
protection. Cf. UCC § 9-312.
47 See Comment, UCC § 9-101.
48 See, e.g., Pemberton, Notice Filing for Assignments of Accounts Receivable, 13 LAw

CONrEwi. PRoB. 643, 651 (1948).
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for example, advances are relatively infrequent.49 In other future advances contexts, advances are more frequent. Use of a future advances
arrangement to finance the customer credit purchases of a department
store, for example, would appear to impose a greater administrative
expense. 50 The first rule may not, however, impose greater administrative expense, since it has been repeatedly stated that in practice lenders
seldom check public records for claims on the borrower's assets. In-

stead, they rely on credit-rating services to supply information about
financial standing.51 As far as administrative expense is concerned, then,

it may be that as a practical matter neither rule will materially affect
either the policy of facilitating secured lending or the policy of promoting the availability of capital under a discretionary advances arrangement.
B. Encouragement of Salvage Lending

If risky entrepreneurial activity is being funded, future advances
lending and financial crises may go hand in hand. Whenever a lender
is making advances on a discretionary basis to a concern which is on
the verge of insolvency, 52 the lender has the choice of continuing to
49 See, e.g., Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. State Pub. School Bldg. Auth., 26 Pa. D.
& C.2d 717 (1961).
50 See Dunham, Inventory and Accounts Receivable Financing,62 HA Y. L. Rzv. 588,

596 (1949); Kripke, The "Secured Transactions" Provisions of the Uniform Commercial
Code, 35 VA. L. REv. 577, 582 (1949).
51 Burman, Practical Aspects of Inventory and Receivables Financing, 15 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROB. 555, 558 (1948); Dunham, Inventory and Accounts Receivable Financing,62
HzAv. L. REv. 588, 610 (1949); Pemberton, Notice Filing for Assignments of Accounts
Receivable, 13 LAw & CoNTEmp. PROB. 643, 652 (1948).
52 If the future advances priority question is decided in the bankruptcy courts, one may
speculate on which view of the security interest-the more restricted discrete interests
view or the broader single interest view-the courts will adopt. Under the Bankruptcy Act
section 60(a), 11 U.S.C. § 1, 30 Stat. 544 (1898), as amended, 52 Stat. 883 (Chandler Act)
(1938), it has 4een held that the giving of priority to the secured lender is not a voidable
preference. Alternative grounds have been offered for this condusion. In In re Bernard &
Katz, Inc., 38 F.2d 40 (2d Cir. 1930), the court upheld the secured lender's interest on the
ground that the future advances substituted for the collateral he had taken. Okin v. Isaac
Goldman Co., 79 F.2d 317 (2d Cir. 1935), upheld the security interest on the ground that
the preference is not voidable because given for present consideration. The soundness of
the view that the advance actually replaces the collateral taken has been questioned, and it
has been suggested that advances close to bankruptcy may actually be dissipated. See
Marsh, Book Review, 13 U.C.LA.L. Rrv. 898, 901-03 (1966). Since an award of priority to
the future advancing lender does amount to a removal of collateral from the debtor's other
creditors, and given the uneasy status of the after-acquired property dause--see Gordon,
The Security Interest in Inventory under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code and
the Preference Problem, 62 COLUM. L. Rnv. 49 (1962)-to which the future advances
arrangement is sometimes compared-see Coogan, 77 HARv. L. Rxv. 997, 1028; 72 HAzv. L.
Rxv. 838, 868-it may be that the courts will not award preference to any future advances
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supply capital in the hope that the enterprise will weather the financial
storm or, for a complex of reasons, of refusing to lend further. Adoption
of the second, or full priority rule (the single interest security interest)
may prompt the lender to extend further credit, since he will know
that he will receive priority over a lien creditor for discretionary advances made subsequent to the intervention of a lien creditor's interest. 13 It is difficult to assess the impact of the full priority rule since
many factors may influence the lender's decision. It may depend upon
the amount of capital already invested in the business which he stands
to lose, the calculated amount that will be needed to pull the business
through, and the lender's estimate of the probability that added capital
is indeed the proper remedy for the concern's financial ills. Perhaps,
indeed, these latter considerations claim paramount importance in the
lender's decision whether or not to continue disbursements.
-see In re Jeavons, 2 U.C.C. Rep. 644 (D.C.N.D. Ohio 1965)-or will limit priority to only
those advances which the lender has obligated himself to make.
Under section 70(c) the language of UCC § 9-301(3), note 29 supra, it has been held that
a trustee in bankruptcy qualifies as a "lien creditor" without notice as a matter of law.
In re Babcock Box Co., 200 F. Supp. 80 (D.C. Mass. 1961). For the priority problem to arise
the lender must make advances after the party becomes a lien creditor, i.e., on the date the
petition in bankruptcy is filed. This situation could occur when a trustee asserted the
rights of an assignee for benefit of creditors, see In re Komfo Products Corp., 247 F. Supp.
229 (E.D. Pa. 1965), and after-assignment advances are made by the secured lender. It
could also arise if "charge-backs" were created after the petition in bankruptcy was filed.
See In re Frederick Speier Footwear Corp., 129 F. Supp. 434 (D.C. Conn. 1955). It seems
that in the first situation, advances after assignment for benefit of creditors but before
petition in bankruptcy is filed, there must be compelling reason to allow preference to the
secured party, because advances are so close to the bankruptcy period. The bankruptcy
courts may find that compelling reason only when advances are made pursuant to a
binding commitment. In the "charge-back" situation no advances, strictly, are made after
the lien creditor appears, but the lien creditor will be seeking a substitution of collateral
for those accounts lost. Here, too, the creditor may have to provide compelling reason to
be given priority.
In the bankruptcy context, then, an institution which is at least partially dedicated to
the protection of creditors who are unsecured-see GIIutoRE § 45.2; Note, Some Possible
Areas of Conflict Between the Illinois Uniform Commercial Code and the Bankruptcy Act,
1962 ILL. L.F. 418-the argument for a restricted view of the secured creditor's security

interest may prevail. As one commentator has concluded:
[This note] has suggested that in view of the potential conflict between the

policy of the Bankruptcy Act in securing equality of distribution in bankruptcy
and the policy of the Code of facilitating the perfection of security interests that
will hold up in bankruptcy ... , the bankruptcy courts may tend to deal harshly
with the provisions of the Code, feeling that they contravene the spirit or the
letter of the Bankruptcy Act and leave unsecured creditors with inadequate

remedy in bankruptcy contests. Note, supra at 437.
It may be conjectured, then, that the secured lender will be given priority only for those
advances made pursuant to a binding commitment.
53 See Lewellyn, Problems in Codifying Security Law, 13 LAw & CONTEMhP. PaoB. 687,

692 (1948).
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VII.

EFFECT OF THE

PRIOR=

RULES ON OTHER

SOURCES OF CREDIT

One or the other priority rule for future advances may affect other
sources of credit available to the borrower. If the second, full priority,
rule is adopted, the borrower may find himself little more than a peon
of his future advancing lender,5 because other sources of credit, secured
or unsecured, may be closed to him. Conceivably, secured lenders might
be deterred from lending money to a borrower whose assets were tied
up in one secured lender for all present and future discretionary advances. Conversely, adoption of the first, qualified priority rule might
open up sources of credit for the borrower. Under the first rule other
secured lenders perfecting their security interest other than by filing
would be willing to advance money because assured of priority over
the first secured lender's subsequent discretionary advances. The practical significance of these speculations depends, at root, on whether
lenders employ broad future advances and after-acquired property
clauses to obtain a kind of financial strangle hold on their borrowers,
and, given the first lender's position, on whether the lending practices
of subsequent creditors would be influenced if the best available claim
to the borrower's property was a second lien on his collateral. For prudent business reasons, sweeping future advances and after-acquired
property arrangements (the Code's "floating lien") may not be used even
though technically they are available."5 It has been reported, however,
that some lenders make a conscious effort to exclude other lenders by
obtaining a powerful grasp over the borrower's collateral. 6
But even if the broad hold were obtained, other secured lenders may
not be deterred from making secured loans. Security has a threat value
as well as a monetary value; removal of an inexpensive but crucial
1
piece of equipment from a plant may interrupt its entire operations.
Lenders may be willing to take second place if they are able to use a
threatened foreclosure of a security interest as an inducement for payment. Furthermore, lenders apparently are willing to loan to those
heavily financed, and rely on matters other than the value of unencumbered assets to determine whether or not to extend credit. These
matters include the financial standing of the borrower's customers, the
estimated capacity of the borrower to maintain and extend his ac54 For an expression of concern about this policy, see, e.g., Llewellyn, Problems of
Codifying Security Law, 13 Lw & CONTEMP. PROB. 687, 691 (1948).
r, See Coogan, Operating under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code Without
Help or Hindranceof the "FloatingLien," 15 Bus. LAw. 373 (1960).
G6 See G. COATES, LAW AND PRATCE IN CHATTEL SEcURED FA~m CRaErr 8-9 (1954).
57 See Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Wels. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Ex. 1854).
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counts, and the lender's hunch as to the probable success of the investment.58 As a practical matter, then, the second, or full priority rule
may not materially reduce the availability of other secured credit to
the borrower. Either lenders may not attempt to grab up all the debtor's
collateral as security for all advances now and in the hereafter, or if
they do, subsequent secured lenders may be willing to extend credit
anyway.
The second, full priority, rule might conceivably reduce unsecured
credit available to the borrower just as it could conceivably reduce the
availability of other secured credit available to the borrower. 9 As in
the secured creditor situation discussed above, estimating the effect of
the presence of security interests in collateral on lending practices is
difficult.6° For example, even assuming the existence of acquisitive lending practices by secured lenders, competitive pressures may force
creditors to continue to extend unsecured credit, 1 distasteful though
it may be. Unsecured lending in general has apparently not suffered
by adoption of the Code, for a drop in the proportion of unsecured
to secured credit has not occurred in Code states, at least if reports
after five8 2 and ten years' 8 experience with it are accurate. Of course,
the constancy of the proportion of unsecured to secured credit in general does not mean that there has been no shift in the proportion in
the specific context of discretionary future advances. Furthermore, since
no state has yet construed the Code's ambiguous future advances priority sections, unsecured lenders may be unaware of their vulnerability
under the second, full priority rule.
VIII. EqurrABLE CONSMERATIONS: DoING WHAT Is FAIR

As remarked earlier, one's inquiry may focus more directly upon
the immediate parties to the dispute in an effort to determine what pri58 See Burman, Practical Aspects of Inventory and Receivables Financing, 13 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROB. 555, 558 (1948); Skilton, The Factor's Lien on Merchandise, 1955 Wis. L.
REV. 609, 625 n.46.
59 A fear of reducing the availability of unsecured credit by adoption of the Code has
been expressed. See Dunham, Inventory and Accounts Receivable Financing,62 HARv. L.
REV. 588, 614 (1949); Hogan, Future Goods, Floating Liens, and Foolish Creditors, 17

STAN. L. REV. 822 (1965).
60 "Mhe degree to which merchandise creditors are affected in their actual contracting
and deliveries by knowledge of the existence of a lien on inventory or receivables or both is

as uncertain a territory of human behavior as there is." Llewellyn, Problems of Codifying
Security Law, 13 LAw & CoNTEmp. PROB. 687, 698 (1948).
81 See A. FARNswoRTH & J. HONNOLD, COMMERCIAL LAW- 309 (1965).
82 Schnader, The Unsecured Creditor--"The Little Businessman" and the Uniform
Commercial Code, 1 B.C. IND. & Com. L. REV. 65 (1959).

68 See NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAws, THE UNIFORM

COMMERCIAL CODE IN PENNSYLVANIA,
PERm CE, NOT TnoRy (1964).

1954-1964, AND IN MASSACHUSETTS,

1958-1964: Ex-
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ority result is "fair." Of course, in choosing one or the other of the
available priority rules on the basis of "fairness" one lessens or increases
the risk which the institutional lender is taking and thus conceivably
affects the availability of the secured future advances loan. Either situational or particular equities, to use Llewellyn's terms,64 could be used
as a basis for deciding what is fair. If one creates a rule with an unvarying result, if the single interest rule is adopted, then individual
cases may have harsh results, but overall the system is fair because its
certainty creates expectation upon which all may act. Thus, once the
secured creditor has perfected his security interest all the world knows
the extent of his security interest and may act accordingly. Of course,
not everyone becomes a creditor voluntarily, such as the victim of a
borrower's tortious act.
The pre-Code common and statutory law, however, seems to have
focused more upon particular than situational equities. The pre-Code
future advances priority rule, with variations, is simple enough.65 If
the secured party had contractually bound himself to make advances,
he was given priority from the date of the execution66 or recordation617
of the security agreement, often a mortgage, "over all subsequent encumbrances to the extent of all advances actually made, regardless of
whether or not they were made before or after the junior encumbrance,
and regardless of whether or not the advancer had constructive or
actual notice of the intervening lien."68 When the lender made the
advances solely at his discretion, the subsequent advances were subordinate to an intervening lien of which the lender had notice, actual or
constructive. 69 By making a distinction between obligatory and discretionary advances, the courts gave greater protection to the lender
who had taken the greater risk of binding himself to a course of dealing
64 K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRAnruoN: DECIDING APPEALS 268-85 (1960).
§§
65 See GILMoRE 1§ 35.2-35A: 1 G. GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES AND PxmEC
372-73 (rev. ed. 1940); 3 G. GLENN, MORTGAGES: § 392-408 (1943); 1 L. JONES, CHATrEL Mow'-

CAGES AND CONDITIONAL SALES §§ 94-98a (6th ed. 1933); 1 L. JoNEs, MORTGAGES §1 447-62 (9th
ed. 1928); G. OSBORNE, MORTGAGES §§ 113-24 (1951); 4 J. PoMMoY, EQUrrY JuRxnDpxu~cz
§11197-99 (5th ed. 1941); Blackburn, Mortgages to Secure FutureAdvances, 21 Mo. L. REv.
209 (1956); Jones, Mortgages Securing Future Advances, 8 TXAs L. REV. 371 (1930); Note,
Comparisonof Real Property Mortgages and Security Interests in Chattels to Secure Future
Advances, 36 CONN. B.J. 463 (1962); Note, Mortgages Securing Future Advances-A Need
for Legislation, 47 IOWA L. REv. 432 (1962); Note, Refinements in Additional Advance
Financing-The"Open End" Mortgage, 38 MINN. L. REv. 507 (1954); Annot, 172 AJ.R.
1079 (1948); Annot., 152 A.L.R. 1182 (1944); Armot., 138 A.L.R. 566 (1942); Annot., 81
A.L.R. 631 (1932); Annot., 53 A.L.R. 580 (1928); Annot., 5 A.L.R. 398 (1920).
66 Eg., Hawaii Laws ch. 172, § 1 (1951), 1 L. JoNE, MORTGAGES § 454 (8th ed. 1928).
67 E.g., Fla. Laws ch. 63-212, §§ 3, 4 (1963).
68 Blackburn, Mortgages to Secure Future Advances, 21 Mo. L. Rxv. 209, 219-20 (1956)
(footnotes omitted).
69 See, e.g., id. at 223-32.
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with the borrower. Two assumptions implicit in this last statement
can be questioned. First, as the discussion in the note7" illustrates it
may not be fair at all to give the obligated lender special status, since,
as a practical matter, he may be able to freely breach his promises to
lend. Second, even if there is a real difference between obligatory and
discretionary advances in its administration, a rule based on the distinction may actually release the courts from any standards of fairness.
Just how "particular" an approach the courts took has been the subject of lively debate among the commentators. Some believe that the
pre-Code rule was in actual practice a cover-up for unlimited judicial
discretion over priority questions. One might expect that the use of a
simple rule of priority in a wide variety of contexts would, with the
change in business conditions over time, necessarily lead to a proliferation of exceptions, making the rule more honored in the breach than
in the observance. Such a fate has befallen other common law rules.7 1
The statement of simple common law and statutory rule of future advances priority, however, remained essentially the same for over a
century.7 2 At least two possible explanations can be given for the rule's
longevity. On the one hand, the courts may have used the rule's distinction between obligatory and discretionary advances as a convenient
tool to fix priorities in accordance with whatever reasons seemed
persuasive in the particular case. They could first pick the party to
whom they wanted to award priority and then construe the future ad70 It has been argued that in legal theory even "unconditionally binding" advances are
discretionary: If the advancing party breaches his promise to make obligatory advances,
he may not be forced to perform on his contract. Rather, the damages to the borrower are
the difference, if any, between the rate of interest which the borrower was required to pay
under his loan with the lender, and the new interest rate which he is required to pay when
he seeks to borrow the money which he was promised. If the difference in interest rates is
large, then that difference will not be regarded as a proximate result of the lender's breach,
but rather as a result of the borrower's lowered credit standing or as the result of a
tightened money market. Thus, the lender, although "obligated" to make advances, may
breach with little fear of serious legal sanction. See GiLMoRE § 35.5; G. OSBORNE, MORTGAGES
§ 117a n.39 (1951) and accompanying text. However, it may be argued that the economic
injury imposed by the legal sanction is not the only deterrent to the breach of a contract to
lend money. The lender's reputation in the business community depends upon honoring
commitments which are regarded as binding, however weak the legal sanction which enforces the commitment. If the lender freely breaches his lending agreements few borrowers
will be attracted to him as a source of credit. Coogan, 77 HARv. L. Rnv. 997, 1031, would
take issue with Professors Gilmore and Osborne: "Both commercially and legally there is
a world of difference between advances which a secured party is committed to make and
those which he can make or refuse at his option."
71 See, e.g., discussion of the rule that an obligor can prohibit the assignment of a
contract claim, RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 151(c) (1932), in GILMoRE § 7.6.
72 For an early statement of the rule, see Boswell v. Goodwin, 31 Conn. 74, 87 (1862)
(dissenting opinion of Butler, J.). For later statements see cases collected in works dted
note 65 supra.
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vances contract to reach the desired result. On the other hand, it may
be that the rule's long life is attributable to judicial satisfaction with
the balancing of conflicting interests which conscientious application of
its distinction between obligatory and discretionary advances could
achieve. Analysis of the cases to discover what the courts were in fact
doing is made difficult because it is impossible to tell whether the courts
are accurately reflecting the contracts before them.
The case of Omaha Coal, Coke & Lime Co. v. Suess73 illustrates the
second guessing that seems necessary in the analysis of future advance
priority cases. In that case a mortgagee under a future advances agreement had received actual notice of an intervening judgment in favor
of a creditor of the mortgagor. The question of priority for advances
made subsequent to that notice, therefore, depended upon whether the
advances were made pursuant to a binding commitment or at the
lender's discretion. The facts of the case showed something of a requirements arrangement between the secured lender and borrower in return
for a promise of exclusive agency. Zimmerman, the borrower-mortgagor,
delivered a deed of his real estate to an agent of the Anheuser-Busch
Brewing Association, the future advancing mortgagee, to secure advances of beer for bottling purposes. In return, Zimmerman agreed to
sell only Anheuser's beer. According to the court, Anheuser's promise
was merely a vague agreement, not a binding contract, and, as a result,
the judgment creditor was awarded priority over the subsequent advances.
At least two interpretations of the case seem possible. On the one
hand, it could be that the court was manipulating the concept of a
binding "contract" to give priority to the general creditor for some
persuasive equity which does not appear in the report.74 Perhaps the
contract, if accurately reflected, would clearly make Anheuser's subsequent advances binding. On the other hand, the agreement between
Anheuser and Zimmerman may be correctly described in the opinion,
and the enforceability of their agreement at this point in time may have
been genuinely doubtful.
If the manipulative interpretation is taken, then a rule based upon
a distinction between binding and discretionary advances would be no
rule at all, but merely a judicial tool for the working of "justice" in
light of the particular facts of each case. If this interpretation is correct,
no lender could ever be sure that he would be awarded priority commensurate with the degree of risk he supposed he was undertaking when
54 Neb. 379, 74 N.V. 620 (1898).
GILMORE § 35.5 argues that any advance may be construed as either obligatory or
discretionary and thus that courts have a rather free hand in deciding priority questions.
73
74
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he had "bound" himself to make advances. It seems unlikely that courts
would be willing to cripple a lending device of which they thought so
highly by increasing the risk associated with it, or to deliberately misread an agreement which all agreed was a binding commitment in
every other respect, just because the secured lender knew of an intervening claim when he made a subsequent disbursement. Moreover, the
non-manipulative interpretation makes the Omaha Coal case consistent
with contract law of the time. Although requirements contracts won
the battle for legal validity, authority indicates that at the turn of the
century they were not enforceable7 5
The courts, then, seemed to think it fairest to subordinate the
secured lender's discretionary advances. One may well question the
soundness of this decision today, when all persons who voluntarily
become creditors have ready access to credit information under the
Code's filing system.
IX. CONCLUSION
The Uniform Commercial Code has not achieved its ambitious task

of clearly assigning priorities to the security interests which it creates.
Depending upon the conception of the security interest which is
adopted, the future advances secured party may or may not receive
priority over intervening lien creditors or holders of security interests
perfected other than by filing. As a result, logical deduction alone cannot solve the priority question. Generally, efforts to resolve it have
focused upon the conceptualistic problem of the "proper" view of the
Code "security interest." Analysis of the priority question in terms of
the policies that the alternative rules could further reveals a number
of difficulties largely of an empirical nature. Since such distinct, conflicting, and interrelated policies are so obviously involved, in fairness
to all citizens, the legislature and not the courts should resolve the

future advances priority issue by specific amendment of the Code. In
addition, legislative inquiry might be able to answer the complex question of the effect of a given priority rule upon these policies.
For the time being, however, in the interests of favoring overall Code
policies of simplicity and protection of secured lending, it seems appropriate, on balance, to adopt the second, or absolute priority rule.
If it proves sufficiently objectionable to award the secured lender priority even for his discretionary advances, a remedy is available in the
form of a legislative amendment.
75 See K. ILzwErLLN, TnE CommoN LAw TP.ADMON: DEcmoNG AmPEAts 242 (1960) (discussing the New York "indefiniteness" cases); Havighurst & Berman, Requirement and

Output Contracts, 27 ILL. L. Rav. 1 (1932); Corbin, The Effects of Options on Consideration, 34 YALE LJ. 571 (1925).

